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Executive summary 
Human activities have increased the concentrations of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere, primarily due to the 
combustion of fossil fuels, but also through changes in land use and land cover. The resulting changes in climate 
and climate variability pose a major threat to the functioning of human and natural systems. The impacts of future 
changes are expected to fall disproportionately on the developing countries (IPCC WGII, 2001). 
As a first step towards reduction of greenhouse gasses emissions to the atmosphere, the Kyoto Protocol was 
signed in 1997. In this protocol, 39 industrialised countries committed themselves to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions to at least 5% below 1990 levels during the period 2008 to 2012. 
The Kyoto Protocol outlines three types of market-based mechanisms: emissions trading, Joint Implementation (Jl) 
and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Emissions trading allows the 39 governments committed to 
collective reductions under the Protocol to trade the right to pollute among themselves. Under this scheme, due to 
start in 2008, a country may choose to buy emission credits from another country that has managed to reduce its 
emissions below its Kyoto targets. 
The CDM has two main objectives: 
1. To assist developing countries who host CDM projects to achieve sustainable development. 
2. To provide developed countries with flexibility for achieving their emission reduction targets by allowing them to 
take credits from emission reducing projects undertaken in developing countries. 
The CDM mechanism provides developing countries with an additional source of income through an environmental 
service: carbon management. The market as it is now emerging is still in its infancy. As for any market, prices will 
depend largely on supply and demand relations and the risks involved. The possibility of getting paid for carbon 
management is expected to stimulate environmental protection and conservation and is expected to be beneficial for 
social circumstances as well. The implementation of the trade mechanisms and how this will benefit the local poor 
will differ per region. 
This study focuses on Central Kalimantan at the Indonesian part of the island Borneo. Large parts of this region are 
covered by peatlands, originally covered by peat swamp forests. In 1996 the Mega Rice Project (MRP) was initiated, 
aimed at increasing the self-sufficiency of Indonesia's food production. To reach that goal, one million hectares of 
peat swamp forest was planned to be converted into rice fields. Between January 1996 and July 1997, more than 
4000 km of drainage and irrigation channels were constructed. As a consequence, the forests became accessible, 
leading to large-scale illegal logging activities and deforestation. The fastest and easiest way of clearing the land is 
by means of fire. In 1997 this practice, together with other factors such as the drought caused by El Nino, dried out 
peatlands due to large-scale drainage, logging activities, led to large-scale forest fires. This in turn led to large 
amounts of carbon being released into the atmosphere, amounting to 1340% of the mean annual global carbon 
emissions from fossil fuels for 1997. 
The C02 market is defined by demand for and supply of C02 reduction possibilities. The study discusses a number 
of different initiatives taken by public and private parties. 
In general, demand for C02 reduction comes from industrialised countries that under the Kyoto Protocol need to 
reduce their greenhouse emissions (Annex 1 countries). Besides these parties, several private corporations (mainly 
fossil fuel and electricity corporations) are initiating projects to offset their own carbon emissions, out of corporate 
green image considerations, or expectation that in the future C02 reductions will become more strict. 
The suppliers of C02 reduction are very diverse, ranging from large multinational energy companies to small local 
operators, and to governments in the so-called non-Annex 1 countries. Most buyers have sought to acquire reductions 
generated within their own home country, and only a handful of projects located in developing countries have 
resulted in successful emissions transactions. Projects located in these countries have greater perceived project 
risk and few developing countries have established adequate institutions to review project proposals and to grant 
necessary host country approvals. 
The financial sector is playing an increasingly important role in the carbon market. Financial dérivâtes already play a 
major role in emission reduction transactions, and the role of market participants who function as brokers to match 
buyers and suppliers or who function as consultants is expected to increase. 
The CDM can be applied to (community) forestry projects and potentially contribute to local livelihoods and 
ecosystem restoration as well. The costs of such a project consist of the costs involved in C02 sequestration itself 
(forest management) and costs involved in CDM management (also called transaction costs). For a project to be 
successful, several criteria have to be met concerning the national and regional institutional setting. The institutional 
requirements at national level are partially described in the Kyoto Protocol and include the establishment of a 
national CDM Authority. Although Indonesia is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol it has not ratified it and meaningful 
follow-up related to the Protocol has been delayed. 
The study also highlights several key elements of project design related to local institutional settings. A transparent 
and well-defined project with clearly outlined compensation mechanisms and strong local participation are some of 
the key elements. Attention should also be given to reducing risks (e.g. from leakage, non-compliance) to the 
investor in the project. Financial institutions can play a role in reducing risks. However, these have not developed 
sufficiently yet to play a concrete role in CDM forestry projects. 
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Additionally 
The Kyoto Protocol established the requirement that Jl and CDM projects may only count emissions reductions that 
are 'additional to what otherwise would have occurred in the absence of the certified project activity' (environmental 
additionality). These reductions must be 'real' and 'measurable', and must be quantified against a project baseline. 
Another form of additionality (financial additionality), is the notion that a project is made commercially viable via its 
ability to generate value in the form of CERs. Currently, there is no international agreement on a method to 
determine financial additionality. 
Annex 1 countries 
These are the 36 industrialised countries and economies in transition listed in Annex 1 of the UNFCCC. Their 
responsibilities under the Convention are various, and include a non-binding commitment to reducing their GHG 
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. 
Annex B countries 
These are the 39 emissions-capped industrialised countries and economies in transition listed in Annex B of the 
Kyoto Protocol. Legally-binding emission reduction obligations for Annex B countries range from an 8% decrease 
(e.g. EC) to a 10% increase (Iceland) on 1990 levels by the first commitment period of the Protocol, 2008 - 2012. In 
practice, Annex 1 of the Convention and Annex B of the Protocol are used almost interchangeably. Note that Belarus 
and Turkey are listed in Annex 1 but not in Annex B and that Croatia, Liechtenstein, Monaco and Slovenia are listed 
in Annex B but not in Annex 1. 
Baseline 
CDM project outcomes are measured and verified against a baseline that reasonably represents the anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) that would occur in the absence of the CDM project. 
Carbon offsets 
Commonly referred to as to indicate the output of carbon sequestration projects in the forestry sector or to refer to 
the output of any climate change mitigation project more generally. Carbon credits - as for carbon offsets, though 
with added connotations of (1) being used as 'credits' in companies' or countries' emission accounts to counter 
'debits' i.e. emissions, and (2) being tradable, or at least fungible with the emission permit trading system. ERUs 
(emission reduction units) - the technical term for the output of Jl projects as defined by the Kyoto Protocol. CERs 
(certified emission reductions) - the technical term for the output of CDM projects, as defined by the Kyoto Protocol. 
Carbon sinks 
A stock that is taking-up carbon is called a sink. Oceans, soils and forests all offer some potential to be managed as 
a sink. 
CER (Certified Emissions Reduction) 
Investors in Clean Development Mechanism projects can earn CER credits for the amount of greenhouse emission 
reductions achieved by their CDM projects. CERs are equal to one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (C02e). 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
The CDM was established by Article 12 of the Protocol and refers to climate change mitigation projects undertaken 
between Annex 1 countries and non-Annex 1 countries (see below). This new mechanism, whilst resembling Jl, has 
important points of difference. In particular, project investments must contribute to the sustainable development of 
the non-Annex 1 host country, and must also be independently certified. This latter requirement gives rise to the 
term certified emissions reductions or CERs, which describe the output of CDM projects and which under the terms 
of Article 12 can be banked from the year 2000, eight years before the first commitment period (2008-2012). 
Emissions Trading (ET) 
Article 17 of the Protocol allows for emissions-capped Annex B countries (see below) to transfer among themselves 
portions of their assigned amounts (AAs) of GHG emissions. Under this mechanism, countries that emit less than 
they are allowed under the Protocol (their AAs) can sell surplus allowances to those countries that have surpassed 
their AAs. Such transfers do not necessarily have to be directly linked to emission reductions from specific projects. 
ERU (Emission Reduction Unit) 
The Kyoto Protocol specified unit of GHG emissions reduction under a Joint Implementation (Jl) project. 
Flexibility Mechanisms 
Refers to the three co-operative implementation mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol (Joint Implementation, 
International Emissions Trading and Clean Development Mechanism). 
GHG (Greenhouse Gasses) 
Generally defined as the six gasses regulated under the Kyoto Protocol, and determined to be the prime 
contributors to the Greenhouse Effect. The GHGs are: 
• carbon dioxide (C02) 
• methane (CH4) 
• nitrous oxide (N20) 
• hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) 
• perfluorocarbons (PFCs) 
• sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) 
Joint Implementation (Jl) 
Set out in Article 6 of the Protocol, Jl refers to climate change mitigation projects implemented between two Annex 1 
countries. Jl allows for the creation, acquisition and transfer of emission reduction units or ERUs. The concept of 
Joint Implementation (Jl) was already introduced in the UNFCCC. Dissatisfaction of developing countries with that Jl 
model led to a compromise in the form of a pilot phase, during which projects were called Activities Implemented 
Jointly (AU). Some AU projects may be reclassified as CDM or Jl projects. 
Kyoto Mechanisms 
The Kyoto Mechanisms, often referred to as Emissions Trading, allows for emissions permits to be created and 
transferred between countries with the objective of minimising the cost of reducing global greenhouse emissions. 
The mechanisms include Joint Implementation (Article 6), the Clean Development Mechanisms (Article 12), and 
International Emissions Trading (Article 17). 
Ratification defines the international act whereby a state indicates its consent to be bound to a treaty if the parties 
intended to show their consent by such an act. 
RMUs (removal units) 
The new technical term representing sink credits generated in Annex I countries, which can be traded through the 
emissions trading and Jl mechanisms 
Signatory 
The head of state or designated official indicates their countries agreement with the adopted text of the convention 
or the protocol and its intention to become a party by signing. 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Established in June 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit, its primary objective is 'the stabilisation of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (man-made) interference 
with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt 
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened, and to enable economic development 
to proceed in a sustainable manner'. 
Validation 
The process of independent evaluation of a CDM project's project design document by a designated Operational 
Entity against the requirements of the UNFCCC CDM. 
Verification 
The periodic independent review and ex-post verification by a Designated Operational Entity of monitored reductions 
in anthropogenic GHG emissions that have occurred as a result of a registered CDM project during the verification 
period. 
1. Introduction 
Human activities have increased the concentrations of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere, primarily due to the 
combustion of fossil fuels but also through changes in land use and land cover. The resulting changes in climate and 
climate variability pose a major threat to the functioning of human and natural systems. The impacts of future 
changes are expected to fall disproportionately on the developing countries (IPCC WGII, 2001). 
The logical response has been to mitigate climate change. However, mitigation alone will not be enough to offset the 
climate change that has already started. Therefore, adaptation will also be necessary to cope with the negative 
effects of climate change. For land use systems synergies between mitigation (carbon sequestration) and adaptation 
(reduced vulnerability as result of increased soil carbon content) exist. Integrating mitigation and adaptation is 
therefore a logical option for land use systems and need to be explored in more detail. 
The Kyoto Protocol has opened the way to seek globally the most cost effective way to reduce carbon emissions or 
enhance terrestrial carbon sinks. Industrialised countries may thus achieve part of their emission reduction target by 
afforestation and reforestation projects in the tropics (Clean Development Mechanism: CDM). The mechanism offered 
by the Kyoto Protocol is unique in its attempt to provide global environmental benefits via local project implementation 
in a global carbon market. 
These paid activities should stimulate environmental protection and conservation. The implementation of the trade 
mechanisms and how this benefits the local poor will differ per region. Positive effects on biodiversity, water 
resources, and erosion are anticipated, linking three large international treaties: United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and United Nations 
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). The Kyoto Protocol is thus a treaty with a clear global dimension, 
but also with a local ecological and local social dimension. 
The market for environmental services is still in its infancy. This study aims to explore the possibilities for Clean 
Development Mechanism projects in the Indonesian peat lands (Kalimantan Tengah). Given the resource constraint of 
the project we will focus on carbon. Chapter 2 describes the Clean Development Mechanism. The environmental 
system of Central Kalimantan is described in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 gives an overview of possible financial systems, 
the institutional setting is discussed in Chapter 5, followed by a general discussion. 
2. The Clean Development Mechanism 
As a first step towards reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere, the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 
1997. In this protocol, 39 industrialised countries committed themselves to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions 
to at least 5% below 1990 levels during the period 2008 to 2012. 
These countries are known as the Annex 1 or Annex B countries. The Netherlands for instance, has a 6% emission 
reduction target for greenhouse gas emissions (carbon dioxide (C02), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20) and the 
fluorinated gases: HFCs, PFCs and SF6). 
Instead of reducing emissions, it is also allowed to increase carbon sequestration in terrestrial ecosystems. Measures 
that are eligible since 1990 under the Kyoto Protocol are ARD (Afforestation, Reforestation and Deforestation) under 
article 3.3 and additional activities in agriculture and forestry under article 3.4. However, the first commitment period 
(2008-2012) allows for reforestation and afforestation only1, other types of land use are still under discussion. 
Annex I countries are not obliged to meet their targets within the country itself. Thus, the Kyoto Protocol has opened 
the way to seek the most cost effective way globally to reduce carbon and non-carbon emissions or enhance terrestrial 
carbon sinks. Industrialised countries may thus achieve part of their emission reduction target by afforestation and 
reforestation projects in the tropics. The mechanisms offered by the Kyoto Protocol are unique in their attempt to 
provide global environmental benefits via local project implementation in a global carbon market. 
The Kyoto Protocol outlines three types of market-based mechanisms: emissions trading, Joint Implementation (Jl) 
and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Emissions trading allows the 39 governments committed to collective 
reductions under the Protocol to trade the right to pollute among themselves. Under this scheme, due to start in 
2008, a country may choose to buy emission credits from another country that has managed to reduce its 
emissions below its Kyoto targets. 
Jl and the CDM grant Northern governments and corporations emission credits through special projects aimed at 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the host country. These projects can be carried out among industrialised 
countries and corporations (Jl) or between one industrialised government or company and one Southern country 
(CDM). 
The CDM has two main objectives: 
1. To assist developing countries who host CDM projects to achieve sustainable development. 
2. To provide developed countries with flexibility for achieving their emission reduction targets by allowing them to 
take credits from emission reducing projects undertaken in developing countries. 
Rules and guidelines are being developed as the market further matures. Different market segments will most likely 
adapt different rules, e.g. the 'voluntary' market allows buyers to establish their own rules, while the international 
market based on Certified Emission is stricter. Although several of the detailed procedures to be applied to CDM 
forestry projects are still to be agreed upon, the overall framework is already established for approving projects and 
accounting for the carbon credits generated (Aukland eta/., 2002; Murdiyarso, 2003): 
1. Only areas that were not forest on 31st December 1989 are likely to meet the CDM definitions of afforestation 
or reforestation. 
2. Projects must result in real, measurable and long-term emission reductions, as certified by a third-party agency 
('operational entities' in the language of the convention). The carbon stocks generated by the project need to 
be secure over the long term (a point referred to as 'permanence'), and any future emissions that might arise 
from these stocks need to be accounted for. 
i Reforestation refers to establishment of forest on land that had recent tree cover, whereas afforestation refers to land that has 
been without forest for much longer. Watson era/., 1998. 
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3. Emission reductions or sequestration must be additional to any that would occur without the project. They 
must result in a net storage of carbon and therefore a net removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. 
This is called 'additionality' and is assessed by comparing the carbon stocks and flows of the project activities 
with those that would have occurred without the project (its 'baseline'). This is to avoid giving credits to projects 
that would have happened anyway. 
4. Projects must be in line with sustainable development objectives, as defined by the government that is hosting 
them. 
5. Projects must contribute to biodiversity conservation and sustainable use of natural resources. 
6. Only projects starting from the year 2000 onwards will be eligible. 
7. Two percent of the carbon credits awarded to a CDM project will be allocated to a fund to help cover the costs 
of adaptation in countries severely affected by climate change (the 'adaptation levy'). This adaptation fund may 
provide support for land use activities that are not presently eligible under the CDM, for example conservation 
of existing forest resources. 
8. Some of the proceeds from carbon credit sales from all CDM projects will be used to cover administrative 
expenses of the CDM (a proportion still to be decided). 
9. Projects need to select a crediting period for activities, either a maximum of seven years that can be renewed 
at most two times, or a maximum of ten years with no renewal option. 
10. The funding for CDM projects must not come from a diversion of official development assistance (ODA) funds. 
11. Each CDM project's management plan must address and account for potential leakage. Leakage is the 
unplanned, indirect emission of C02, resulting from the project activities. For example, if the project involves 
the establishment of plantations on agricultural land, then leakage could occur if people who were farming on 
this land migrate to clear forest elsewhere. 
12. The emission reduction should also account for non-C02 Green House Gases (GHGs such as N20, CH4). 
The first commitment period or window (2008 - 2012) allows for reforestation and afforestation only, other types of 
land use are still under discussion2. 
The CDM mechanism provides developing countries with an additional source of income through an environmental 
service: carbon management. The market as it is now emerging is still in its infancy. As for any market, prices will 
depend largely on supply and demand relations and the risks involved. The possibility of getting paid for carbon 
management is expected to stimulate environmental protection and conservation, and is expected to be beneficial 
for social circumstances as well. The implementation of the trade mechanisms and how this will benefit the local 
poor will differ per region. 
Details on the project cycle are not discussed in this document, for information on the project cycle look at www.unfccc.int 
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3. Central Kalimantan 
In this study, we focus on Central Kalimantan at the Indonesian part of the island Borneo. Large parts of this region 
are covered by peatlands, originally covered by peat swamp forests. It used to be a very sparsely populated area, 
where the human impact on the environment was negligible. In 1996 the Mega Rice Project (MRP) was initiated, 
aimed at increasing the self-sufficiency of Indonesia's food production. To reach that goal, one million hectares of 
peat swamp forest was planned to be converted into rice fields. Between January 1996 and July 1997, more than 
4000 km of drainage and irrigation channels were constructed. As a consequence, the forests became accessible, 
leading to large-scale illegal logging activities and deforestation. The fastest and easiest way of clearing the land is 
by means of fire. At the beginning of the dry season in 1997, many fires were ignited. The El Nino Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO) event of that year extended the dry season, so that large areas were burned. Due to the new 
drainage system the upper peat layers dried out and also caught fire. Fires spread out from the logged areas into 
the primary forest. The peat layers represent an enormous stock of carbon. As a result of the large fires, it was 
estimated that between 0.81 and 2.57 Gt of C02 were released to the atmosphere, which is more than the annual 
emission of the total European Union (Page et al., 2002). The cleared peatlands are not suitable for the cultivation of 
rice. A vast area is left behind, mostly deprived from its original vegetation and not very suitable to grow food for the 
local population. Due to the drainage, the peat is slowly decomposing, releasing the stored carbon to the atmosphere. 
There is still the risk of new massive fires, again leading to the release of large amounts of carbon. 
3.1 Population and employment 
The Central Kalimantan province holds five regencies and one municipality, 85 districts, 1,328 villages including 
transmigration places settlements and indigenous natives civilisation settlements. 
In 2000 the total population of Central Kalimantan was 1,823,715, of which 49% female and 51% male. The population 
density is approximately 12 persons per square kilometre. In 2000 2641 households (10551 persons) consisted of 
incoming migrants through the transmigration programme. The teacher student ratio in 2000 was 1:20 for the 
elementary levels, and 1:10 for the university level. Of the total population, 4.5% is illiterate, well below the average 
(10%) for Indonesia. More than 80% of the work force has not finished elementary school or secondary school. The 
health system is basic with an average of 1 doctor per 9000 persons. 
The largest part of the labour force is employed in agriculture (55%), whereas the finance sector has the lowest 
employment. In 2000 47.5% of the regional income was provided by the agricultural sector, followed by trading, 
restaurants and hotels at 18%, transportation and communication at 8.6%, services at 8.5%, and industry at 6.9%. 
As result of the economic crises in Indonesia the number of large and medium scale industries dropped from 100 in 
1997 to 80 in 1999, resulting in a substantial loss of jobs. 
Productivity of food crops, notably wetland and dryland paddy, has increased from 2.2 ton per ha in 1996 to 2.4 ton 
per ha in 2000. The decreasing forest area also means a decreasing timber production. Animal husbandry (pig, 
poultry, sheep) and fishery (mainly sea-fish) provide a valuable source of protein. Statistical data of this section was 
taken from Kalimantan Tengah dalam angka (2000). 
3.2 Current land use and possible land use options 
No area data were found for the current land use situation. In 1997, before the start of the Mega Rice Project, 
the land cover situation in a study area of about 5 Mha is shown in Table 1, as well as the changes in the period 
1991-1997. These figures were obtained via remote sensing. 
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Table 1. Land use (1997) and land use change (1991-1997) as assessed by remote sensing for a study area 
in Central Kalimantan (Boehm & Siegert, 2000). 
Vegetation type 
Closed forest 
Open forest 
Fragmented forest 
Forest plantation 
Forest regrowth 
Mosaics 
Grasslands, woods & shrubs, non forest regrowth 
Agriculture 
Unvegetated 
Not visible 
No data 
Land cover 
in 1997 
(ha) 
2,231,239 
365,132 
494,471 
29,244 
60,146 
477,875 
354,900 
408,606 
245,529 
441,829 
76,690 
Land cover 
in 1997 
(%) 
43.0 
7.0 
9.5 
0.6 
1.2 
9.2 
6.8 
7.9 
4.7 
8.5 
1.5 
Land cover change 
1991-1997 
(% relative to 1991) 
-8.3 
-1.6 
-0.4 
0 
-0.3 
-1.9 
-0.5 
1.1 
4.4 
7.4 
0 
Roughly, current land cover can be classified as follows: 
Forest, including undisturbed forest, logged over forest and spontaneous regrowth 
Forest plantations 
Grasslands, woods, shrubs 
Agriculture 
Unvegetated 
Forest 
Peat swamp forests encompass a sequence of forest types running from the perimeter to the centre of each 
swamp. Six forest communities that have a distinct structure, physiognomy, and flora are discernible (Anderson, 
1983; Whitmore, 1984). Ramin (Gonystylus bancanus Kurtz) and Meranti (Shorea albida) are the most valuable 
timber tree species in these forest types. Illegal logging has increased considerably after the construction of the 
drainage canals, through an improved accessibility. Also legal logging takes place, with a proposed cutting cycle of 
35 years. The growth rate of the trees is lower than in comparable forest types on mineral soil. 
Forest plantations 
Forest plantations form only a very small part of the land cover. Some local people have started to grow a range of 
peat swamp tree species, including ramin, in small plantations. In recent years, the cultivation of estate crops, 
particularly coconut and oil palm, has rapidly expanded onto the lowland peats of Indonesia, especially in Riau and 
West Kalimantan, utilising deep peats. The establishment of plantations faces many specific problems related to the 
substrate. 
Grasslands 
Part of the peatlands are invaded by the aggressive grass species Imperata cylindrica, locally known as alang-alang. 
This species is prone to fire and is not very suitable for cattle grazing. Due to its high competitiveness it is not easy 
to convert these grasslands into other land uses. 
Agriculture 
Originally, agriculture was only practised at the shallow peats along the rivers, where crops such as rice could be 
grown. Also pineapple, banana and cassava, vegetables and various types of beans are cultivated here. The deep 
peats that became available after clearing the forest are not suitable for rice. A variety of other species are 
attempted, with varying success (Table 2). Farmers' experience and various studies carried out so far strongly 
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indicate that horticultural crops are the most suitable commodities on the peat soils, irrespective of peat thickness. 
One of the problems of agriculture on peat soils is the low fertility of the substrate. 
Table 2. Suitability of various crops on peat soils based on peat thickness (Boehm &Siegert, 2000). 
Thickness of peat 0-100 100-200 >200 
Wetland rice 
Upland food crops: rice, soybean, corn, peanut, etc. 
Horticulture: Chinese cabbage, papaya, pineapple, 
cucumber, kankung, etc. 
Estate crops: coconut, oil palm, rubber, cacao, 
coffee, etc. 
Industrial crops: rami, medicinal, etc. 
Moderate 
High 
High 
High 
High 
Low 
Moderate 
High 
Moderate 
Moderate 
-
Low 
High 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Unvegetated 
Part of the area is unvegetated for various reasons. Some parts are recently burned and have not yet revegetated 
and other parts have been seriously degraded making growth virtually impossible. 
3.3 Land use and carbon 
When the peat is still accumulating, undisturbed peat swamp forest is probably a small net sink of carbon, and 
otherwise it will be more or less in balance. Draining and conversion of this forest will inevitably lead to loss of 
carbon, both from biomass and soil. Not many studies of biomass and carbon sequestration in undisturbed peat 
swamp forests have been conducted. However, we can get a rough idea if we compare with lowland dipterocarp 
forests which are much richer in biomass. Yamakura et al. (1986) found an aboveground biomass of 5091 dry 
matter per hectare on a 1 hectare sample plot. If we assume a carbon content of 50%, we get an estimate of 
around 2501 carbon per hectare in aboveground biomass. This agrees quite well with Kuusipalo etal. (1996) who 
give a value of slightly less than 2401 carbon per hectare; these authors estimate the carbon stock in the root 
system to be about 951 per hectare. 
Forest plantations 
Of the other land uses, the carbon balance of tree plantations probably comes closest to the one of the original 
swamp forest. If tree species are used that are adapted to high groundwater levels, peat decomposition can be 
slowed down by maintaining a high groundwater table. The stems of the trees will sequester carbon, but it depends 
on the management regime how large its contribution to the total carbon balance will be. We made some preliminary 
calculations for Acacia and oil palm plantations. 
Acacia mangium plantation 
Acacia mangium Willd\s one of the species that can be used for plantations in Indonesia. According to Kuusipalo 
etal. (1996) it can be used to outcompete Imperata on grasslands. Due to the low fertility of the*peat, it will 
probably grow slower than the growth rates of up to 60 m3 ha1 yr1 on mineral soils that are mentioned in the 
literature. For this case we assumed an average growth rate of 25 m3ha' yr'. We derived relative proportions of 
biomass in stem, leaves and branches at different ages from the sample trees and biomass equations from the 
project 'Carbon sequestration of man-made forest in the tropics' (Http://www.f.waseda.jp/yasu/database.html). 
From the average growth rate we derived biomass in stems at different ages, from which we estimated biomass in 
leaves and branches. For turnover of foliage we assumed 1 and for turnover of branches we assumed 0.2. Roots 
have not been included since no data are available. We assumed a rotation of 10 years. After 10 years, a total 
aboveground carbon stock of about 601 per hectare will be reached. This is much less than the 1201 reported by 
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Kuusipalo étal. (1996) The difference is probably caused by the lower growth rate we assumed, and may also be 
influenced by differences in branch and leaf biomass. See Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Carbon stock development in aboveground biomass of Acacia mangium plantation in a 10-year 
rotation, average increment 25 m3 ha1 yr'. 
Oil palm 
Oil palm is regarded as a possible crop on peatlands. Based on biomass data from Cannell (1982), we made an 
estimate of aboveground biomass development in an oil palm plantation. With an assumed rotation of 15 years, a 
maximum carbon stock of about 601 per ha is reached after 15 years. However, the sample data were from mineral 
soils. Due to the low fertility of the peat, carbon stocks will probably be lower on peatlands. See Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Carbon stock development in aboveground biomass of an oil palm plantation, based on data from 
Malaysia. 
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Grasslands 
Imperata grasslands on mineral soils have an aboveground stock of 5-15 ton C per ha, and the belowground stock 
in roots and rhizomes is about half of that (Kuusipalo et ai, 1996). The figures for Imperata on peat will probably not 
be very different from those on mineral soils. 
Agriculture 
The carbon stock in biomass on agricultural sites is very small since it is harvested every year. This means that 
there is no net effect of biomass growth on carbon sequestration. Due to the drainage, the peat will continuously 
decompose, turning agriculture into a net source of carbon. Additionally, often ash is applied from burned vegetation 
from elsewhere. So besides the impact on the site itself, agriculture is likely to change the carbon balance of other 
areas as well. 
There may be other uses of peatland areas than those already mentioned. One of the possibilities is the use of peat 
for energy production. Out of 8.8 Mha of deep peat in total Indonesia, 4.46 Mha is estimated to be potentially 
extractable for energy production and other non-renewable uses. This amounts to 3 billion tons of peat. However, 
peat extraction could lead to serious degradation of the area and is not a sustainable and renewable source of 
energy. 
In general, we see that all drainage and conversion of forest leads to carbon loss. Of the substituting land uses, tree 
plantations will probably have the least negative effects on the carbon balance since they will form some biomass 
that remains on the site for a longer period. Imperata grassland, agriculture and unvegetated sites will have a very 
low carbon stock (Table 3). 
Table 3. Carbon stock in living biomass in various land use types. 
Fallow 
Imperata 
Agriculture 
Oil palm 
Acacia 
Natural forest 
Aboveground 
small 
10 
small 
<30 
30 
<240 
Belowground 
small 
5 
small 
? 
? 
<95 
3.4 Problems with cultivation of deep peatlands 
Several problems arise during crop cultivation on deep peat. Most peats are poor in nutrients and are very acidic 
(pH usually < 4). Fertilisation is often done by applying ash of burned vegetation on the soil. However, large 
quantities of ash are needed to sustain production. Manure is another possible source of nutrients. 
Managing peatlands is managing water. After draining and clearing, the peat will relatively quickly,subside due to 
drying and decomposition. After a while, this will slow down to 2-5 centimetres per year. Subsidence speed may be 
controlled to a certain extent by controlling drainage. Due to the subsidence and the loose nature of the peat, the 
anchorage of trees will be problematic. If the peat is compacted before establishment of the tree crop, subsidence 
will be limited and root anchorage will be less problematic. Another problem related to the loose structure of the 
peat is its low carrying capacity, which causes problems in mechanical farming. Also many undecomposed and 
partly decomposed logs in the soil hamper mechanisation. 
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Generally, ground level differences in the peatlands are very small. Due to the subsidence of the peat, the 
topography may change, causing problems such as flooding and waterlogging after heavy rainfall. In order to 
cultivate deep peat, a good water management system is required to regulate the groundwater level. 
3.5 Risks 
The existence of risks is an important factor in CDM projects. Risks pertain to the (unintentional) loss of carbon from 
the forest project due to various factors. Some are related to forest (or carbon) management, others are related to 
the procedures linked to the CDM (e.g. financial aspects, payments etc). The risks should be clear to those parties 
buying carbon emission reductions. When trading, it is in the interest of both parties that the risk of failure is low; 
eliminating risk is not possible but reducing it to an acceptable level should be possible. 
In Kalimantan, forest fires constitute a major risk of loss of sequestered carbon. Fire is part of the peatland forest 
system and controlled fire is used to clear land for agriculture. Uncontrolled fires, e.g. as result of poorly managed 
controlled fires, can lead to large-scale destruction of peatland and vegetation. Tropical peatlands are, during the 
dry season, highly susceptible to fire. In 1997-'98, fires devastated 5.2 +- 0.3 million hectares in East Kalimantan 
(Siegert et ai, 2001). Table 4 shows the damaged area for different land covers. 
Table 4. Damaged area for different land covers in East Kalimantan. 
Land cover 
Grassland (mainly Imperata cylindrical, low bushes 
Lowland dipterocarp forest 
Mangrove forest 
Peat swamp forest 
Secondary forest, plantation, farmland 
Wetlands 
Land cover not mapped by ERS (mainly highland 
dipterocarp forest) 
Total 
Area (ha) 
368,900 
5,379,600 
1,042,100 
426,100 
2,283,400 
358,700 
3,882,600 
13,741,400 
Burned (ha) 
292,600 
2,177,900 
91,700 
311,100 
1,723,400 
290,400 
330,800 
5,217,900 
Burned (%) 
79.3 
40.5 
8.8 
73.0 
75.5 
81.0 
8.5 
-
Source: Siegert et ai, 2001. 
Page et al. (2002) estimated that in 1997 between 0.81 and 2.57 Gt of carbon was released into the atmosphere 
as a result of burning of peat and vegetation in Indonesia. This amount is equivalent to 1340% of the mean annual 
global carbon emissions from fossil fuels. 
The damage by fire was greater (49.5%) in recently logged forest areas (between 1966-1998) than in earlier logged 
forests (26.3%) or pristine forests (17.3%). This means that the risk from damage by fire decreases as the forest 
matures. However, it also means that (illegal) logging will increase the risk. If risks from forest damage are to be 
lowered, then land-use policies should be in place to control logging, or to introduce reduced impact logging 
techniques. Otherwise, recurrent fires will lead to a complete loss of lowland forest (Siegert et ai, 2001). 
Besides the risks related to forest or carbon management, a reliable legal and institutional infrastructure needs to be 
in place to be able to start payments for environmental services. As the rules for the CDM are still not clear, capacity 
is lacking to implement and monitor carbon projects. Especially in Kalimantan the necessary institutional infrastructure 
is not yet in place (see Chapter 5). 
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4. The financial system 
4.1 Definition of the C02 market 
We will investigate the C02 market by taking a closer look at the demand and supply side of C02 reduction. The market 
is still in its infancy, but it is growing and with several important initiatives underway. The market is, for instance, 
expected to increase by the decision taken by the EU Commission in December 2002 that 'The EU Member States 
collectively must reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 8% between 2008 and 2012. For the period up to 
2008, the Parties undertake actions to make demonstrable progress in achieving their commitments by no later 
than 2005' (EU, 2002). This way, the EU will by 2005 be well prepared to participate in the emissions trading system 
foreseen in the Kyoto Protocol. 
4.1.1 Demand for C02 reduction 
UNEP-FI (2002) identifies five categories of buyers of C02 reduction: 
1. Institutional multilateral (e.g. World Bank PCF, IFC, Asian Development Bank) 
2. Public Sector Unilateral (e.g. Dutch ERUPT programme, UK Climate Challenge Fund) 
3. Private Sector Funds (e.g. Edison Electric Institute, Fondelec, Black Emerald) 
4. Bilateral Transactions: mainly involving large industrial corporations (e.g. Shell, TransAlta) 
5. Green Certificate Buyers: heterogeneous marketplace requiring heavily structured deals 
Some of these will be discussed in the section about existing mechanisms. 
The demand for C02 reduction comes from industrialised countries that under the Kyoto Protocol need to reduce 
their greenhouse emissions, the Annex 1 countries. The Kyoto Protocol allows these countries to achieve part of 
their reduction targets via projects in developing countries. Clearly, countries that have little possibilities to achieve 
the targets within their boundaries or where costs to achieve the goals are high, are potential buyers. For example, 
the Dutch government has agreed that a substantial part of their emission reduction should be achieved within the 
Netherlands itself and the remaining part should be achieved in other countries through the three Kyoto mechanisms, 
including CDM. 
Besides countries, companies are becoming increasingly active on the carbon market. This is partly related to 
motivations of 'greening' the corporate image or because of stewardship considerations, but at the end of the day it 
also makes economic sense: carbon is money. Especially power producers such as electric companies and petro-
chemical concerns such as BP Amoco or Shell International are active in this field. There are several reasons why 
they voluntarily commit to reduction programs. One important reason, especially for those who emit more carbon 
dioxide per dollar of operating revenue than others, is the perceived risk of binding limitation that will be imposed on 
GHG emissions in the future. They can hedge this risk by reducing GHG now because it is believed that current 
reductions are relatively inexpensive compared to likely future prices in a regulated emissions trading system. Also, 
gaining experience in emission trading in an early stage might help them in the future, when emission reduction 
could be obligatory. Besides this, companies have reacted to public concern over the greenhouse effect. 
Estimates based on the potential carbon trade in North America and Europe indicate that it could be worth 30 to 
100 USS billion when fully operational (Totten, 1999) and a market clearing price with full carbon trading in the US 
could go to 3040 US$ per ton and as high as 70-80 US$ per ton in Europe and Japan. 
Interest to invest in (small scale) CDM forestry projects in developing countries may not lie in the possibility for cost-
efficient C02 reduction alone but in the combination of C02 reduction with improving local livelihoods of poor 
communities. In this way, C02 reductions are coupled with sustainable development, as was outlined in the Kyoto 
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protocol (article 12.2). Also, CDM forestry conservation projects may be in line with the Convention of Biological 
Diversity (CBD), which may add an additional incentive to invest in these schemes. 
4.1.2 Supply of C02 reduction 
The suppliers of C02 reduction are very diverse, ranging from large multinational energy companies to small local 
operators, and to governments in the so-called non-Annex 1 countries. Most buyers have sought to acquire reductions 
generated within their own home country, and only a handful of projects located in developing countries have 
resulted in successful emissions transactions. Projects located in these countries have greater perceived project 
risk and few developing countries have established adequate institutions to review project proposals and to grant 
necessary host country approvals (Rosenzweig et al., 2002), with Costa Rica as a notable exception. Costa Rica 
became the first country to turn its forests into marketable carbon sinks by issuing 'Certified Tradable Offsets' 
(CTOs), based on a forest carbon sequestration program with performance guarantees, carbon reserve pools and 
third party certification (see also Subak, 2000). 
However, tropical developing countries can offer low cost carbon offset opportunities. Based on Brown (1997) and 
WCFSD (1997), Totten (1999) estimates that some 700 million hectares of land in developing countries and countries 
in transition might be economically attractive for forest carbon programs, resulting in 60 to 87 billion tons of carbon 
cumulatively conserved and sequestered by 2050, equivalent to 11-15 percent of the fossil fuel emission over that 
period. However, if factors such as land tenure, institutional capacity, and other (socio-economic) constraints are 
taken into account, these figures may be lower. 
For these non-Annex 1 countries, it can be attractive to host forest carbon programs, because forests can provide 
several other functions such as watershed protection and controlling or maintaining biodiversity (Meijerink, 1995). 
For local communities there are also a number of benefits to be gained in participating in a CDM project, although 
Smith & Scherr (2002) warn that these benefits can only be gained if the CDM project fulfils several criteria 
(see 5.2). These gains can consist of livelihoods derived from forestry, but may also consist of direct or indirect 
payments for carbon sequestration. 
Not only forest can capture carbon but other forms of land use and land management provide opportunities as well. 
These, however, are not eligible in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. 
4.2 Examples of Emission Trading Schemes 
In December 2002, the EU reached an agreement on an EU GHG emissions trading system (EU ETS), which will 
establish absolute limits on the emissions of C02. By this agreement, the EU has established the first trans-national 
emissions trading scheme in the world. In light of the upcoming EU enlargement, the scheme could cover up to 
30 countries in the period up to 2012. The C02 emissions expected to be covered by the scheme are estimated to 
account for about 46% of the EU 15 members' total C02 emissions in 2010, and about 4,000 to 5,000 installations 
across the existing EU Member States will be affected (GBN, 2002). 
Elements agreed include: 
• Opt-out: Although trading will start in 2005, individual installations or economic activities can be exempted from 
emissions trading in the final period in 2005-2007. Opt-outs are, however, subject to approval by the Commission 
on strict conditions. These notably include fulfilling the same emissions reduction requirements as companies 
and installations participating in the scheme. 
• Opt-in: Member States can unilaterally include additional sectors and gases from 2008 onwards, subject to 
approval by the Commission. 
• Pooling: The agreement also provides for the possibility for companies to pool their emission allocations until 
2012. 
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• Allocation of emission rights: Allocations of emission permits will be free of charge, but Member States can 
auction up to 10% of their allowances from 2008. 
• Penalties: The penalty rate foreseen for the period from 2005-2007 has been slightly reduced from 50 $ to 
40 $ per ton of C02 equivalent emitted in excess of the allowance. It will be 100 $ thereafter. 
Several governments have initiated a GHG emissions trading system. Rosenzweig et al. (2002) and De Conink & 
Van den Linden (2003) mention three of such schemes, in the US, Denmark and the UK, which we will discuss 
briefly. The EU system is a trans-national system, and it is still unclear how the systems of Denmark and the UK will 
fit into this larger system. 
Massachusetts was the first US state to impose C02 emissions limits on old fossil-fuel-fired power plants. The 
reduction can be met through internal actions such as repowering from coal to natural gas, but also through the 
purchase of offsets for compliance. Although specific rules for crediting offsets are not yet in place, emissions 
reduction or sequestration projects must demonstrate to the Massachusetts Dept of Environmental Protection that 
the reductions are real, surplus, verifiable, permanent and enforceable. 
The Danish government introduced the C02 Quota Act in 1999, which imposes a cap on power sector C02 emissions. 
For 2000, the Act specifies a total emissions quota for electricity producers of 23 million metric tons of C02. By 
2003 this cap will have been tightened to 10 million metric tons. Electricity producers can trade their emission 
allowances among each other and each year until 2003. If an electricity producer's annual emissions exceed its 
holding of allowances, it is subject to a penalty of US$ 5-6 per metric ton excess. The revenue from penalties is 
directed toward energy-saving projects. 
In 2001, the UK government published the final framework for a national GHG trading program that covers most of 
industry, and all GHGs. With this program, the UK is the first industrialised country to develop such a broad-based 
GHG program. Although the program is voluntary, companies are induced to participate through a tax on industrial 
and commercial energy consumption, known as the Climate Change Levy (CCL). 
4.3 Examples of project-based programs 
Besides government systems such as the emission trading schemes discussed above, there are several project-
based initiatives that are taken by individual companies to achieve voluntary reduction commitments or programs 
initiated by (national or state) governments that allow companies to reduce their emissions voluntarily. We will 
discuss a few examples (information based on: Rosenzweig et al., 2002; Face, 2003; De Conink & Van der Linden, 
2003). 
4.3.1 Emission Reduction Unit Procurement Tender (ERUPT) 
ERUPT is an initiative by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, designed to assist the Netherlands in achieving its 
national emissions limit under the Kyoto Protocol through the purchase of Emission Reduction Units (ERUs). ERUPT 
projects must adhere to criteria issued by the Ministry's implementing agency SENTER. Purchases from five projects 
(all in Eastern Europe) in the first round involved a total of 4.2 million metric tons of C02 reductions, valued at a total 
of US$ 31 million. Two additional tenders have followed - a second round of ERUPT and a Certifies ERUPT which is 
designed to purchase reductions generated from CDM-like projects (aiming at 3 million metric tons of C02 at 
US$ 4245 per metric ton). 
The Dutch Government has established a separate CDM Division to use the funds allocated by the Dutch government 
to purchase Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). In fact, the purchase of CERs creates an additional return on 
project investments. As a result, sustainable projects can be realised, which would not have been feasible without 
the possibility of selling CERs. 
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CERs are purchased through the following four tracks: 
1. Multilateral international financial institutions. 
2. SENTER International, a Dutch agency acting on behalf of several Dutch Ministries. 
3. Private financial institutions. 
4. Bilateral purchase agreements with Host Countries. 
These intermediaries select sustainable projects in developing countries and purchase the resulting CERs. Investors 
from all countries may submit CDM project proposals to these intermediaries who will judge these projects, including 
the compliance with the requirements. 
4.3.2 Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) 
The PCF was established by the World Bank in 1999 to acquire high-quality project generated emissions reductions 
that could potentially be eligible for international recognition under rules governing Jl and CDM. Private firms and 
governments have invested a total of US$ 180 million. The PCF has purchased reductions from three projects in 
Latvia, Uganda and Chile. 
These two programs, which have a portfolio of 37 CDM and 12 Jl projects, are fully consistent with the Kyoto 
Protocol, and the emerging framework for Jl and CDM. They are therefore nominated for approval by the UNFCCC. 
However, De Conink & Van der Linden (2003) emphasise that the UNFCCC has not yet certified any organisation to 
verify and monitor JI/CDM projects. 
The World Bank recently launched the BioCarbon Fund. This fund which will purchase emission reductions potentially 
eligible for credit under the Kyoto Protocol. Besides the CDM route, a Jl route is opened which aims to demonstrate 
how carbon projects can work. The rules for the Jl are less strict as it is primarily designed as a learning process. 
4.3.3 Finnish CDIVf/JI Pilot Programme 
In 2000, the Government of Finland has launched the CDM/JI Pilot Programme in preparation for the Kyoto Protocol. 
The aim of the programme is to gather experience in issues specific to the CDM/JI project cycle and to facilitate the 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in Finland. The invitation to propose small-scale CDM projects closed on 
31 March 2003. In total, 28 tenders were received, from South America, Asia and Africa. The evaluation of tenders 
is in progress. Projects included in the programs pipeline will produce emission credits until 2012 at least. 
4.3.4 US Initiative on Joint Implementation (USUI) 
Although the US did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, several different initiatives for C02 reduction are ongoing in the US. 
The US Initiative on Joint Implementation (USUI) was the first Jl pilot program, initiated under the 1993 US Climate 
Change Action Plan. It was established to demonstrate viability of project-based emissions trading. To date the USUI 
has approved 50 projects in 26 countries (both developed and developing). 
4.3.5 The Climate Trust (Oregon) 
This initiative, taken in 1997 by the State of Oregon, obliges new power plants to offset a portion of their projected 
C02 emissions as a condition for obtaining an operating permit. They may do this by acquiring qualifying offsets in 
the market or by paying US$ 0.85 per metric ton of C02 to the Climate Trust. So far all have chosen the latter 
option and five projects will funded from the first million dollars in the Climate Trust. These projects are all located in 
North America, except for one, which is in Ecuador. A second round of contracts (US$ 5.5 million) will be awarded 
coming years. 
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4.3.6 Activities Implemented Jointly Pilot Phase (AU) 
This program was initiated at the first Conference Of Parties (COP-1) to the UNFCC in 1995 to gain experience with 
Jl and CDM-like projects. Although the pilot phase was supposed to end in 2000, it continued after the COP-7 in 
Marrakech and has undertaken 155 projects in 41 countries. 
4.3.7 Pilot Emissions Reduction Trading Project (PERT, Ontario) 
This well-known Canadian initiative was undertaken by industry and government of Canada to explore and promote 
emissions trading by fostering voluntary reduction activities. To date it has evaluated a number of projects that 
together have led to the registration of 14.6 million metric tons of C02 reduction. 
4.4 Company initiatives 
Several companies have set up their own C02 reduction programs, notably the fossil fuel and electricity companies. 
We will discuss a few examples here. 
4.4.1 BP 
In 1998 BP committed to reduce its GHG emissions 10% below 1990 levels by 2001. It collaborated with the NGO 
Environmental Defence and launched a pilot project phase in 1999 involving 12 of its business units located in 
different countries. In 2000, 2.7 million metric tons of C02 were traded at an average price of $ 7.5 per metric ton. 
4.4.2 Shell 
In 1998, also Shell committed itself to reduce GHG emissions 10% below 1990 levels by 2002. In 2000 it instituted 
its Shell Tradable Emission Permit System (STEPS) program which is modelled after CDM. Around 20 of its units 
were required to participate in the program (amounting for 30% of corporate emissions). It has established caps for 
units in developed countries (Annex B) but also allows units in developing countries (non-Annex B) to generate project-
based reductions and sell them into the system. However, the Shell emission trading scheme was not successful 
due to the voluntary nature of the scheme and therefore ceased to exist. 
4.4.3 FACE 
The Dutch Electricity Board (SEP), a consortium of five electricity companies, created the FACE Foundation to 
promote the planting of forests to absorb an amount of C02 equivalent to the emissions of a medium-sized coal-fired 
power plant during its 40-year life span (Moura-Costa, no date). Since 2000, the Face Foundation is working at the 
development and reconnaissance of markets for the acquisition of funds in order to keep fulfilling its objectives. 
Services related to Face's objectives concerning forestry and climate are: 
• Supplier of verified carbon credits; 
• Implementation of forestry projects; 
• Generation of carbon credits through forestry projects; 
• Consultancy on climate projects, baselines, forestry projects, certification, etc. 
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4.5 Possible future directions: financial dérivâtes and 
brokers 
Rosenzweig étal. (2002) estimate that already between 25 and 50% of the emission reduction transactions have 
involved an exchange of financial dérivâtes. Once the carbon trading market becomes more mature, it is to be 
expected that the number of transactions involving these dérivâtes will increase. We will (after Rosenzweig et al., 
ibid.) discuss four of these: call options, put options, collars and fences on VERs (Verifiable Emission Reductions), 
or other emissions commodities. 
Call options 
A buyer of a call option, which is simply a contract specifying certain responsibilities, buys from a seller the right but 
not the obligation to purchase a fixed quantity of emissions at a fixed price (strike price) on or before a fixed date in 
the future (expiration date). The buyer pays the seller of the call option to accept the corresponding responsibility to 
sell emissions reductions according to the agreed terms. The amount paid for the option is called the premium. 
Sellers are allowed to keep the premium even if the buyer fails to use the option. In this way, call options are a 
relatively inexpensive way to hedge risks related to future compliance costs (which may be much higher than current 
costs). 
Put options 
A put option entitles its buyer the right to sell a commodity (e.g. VER) at the strike price on or before the expiration 
date. The seller of the option is required to purchase the commodity at the agreed price if the buyer uses the option. 
The premium is paid by the buyer to the seller at the time the initial transaction is closed. 
Collars or fences 
These involve two transactions in which one party buys a call and sells a put (usually with different strike prices and 
the same expiration date), and another sells a call and buys a put. By setting a price floor and ceiling, each position 
will provide protection against market movement. 
Swaps 
These are transactions in which one type commodity is exchanged for another, rather than for cash. Swaps in 
emission trading can involve tax benefits when tax authorities consider them to be non-taxable 'like-kind exchanges'. 
The EU's emissions trading scheme, which was agreed by the EU's environment ministers in December 2002 and is 
expected to be implemented in 2005, has already led to the first speculative trades. In Germany, traders have begun 
brokering speculative trades of C02 certificates between companies (E5 News & Press, January 2003) 
Another development that is to be expected is the increase in market participants who function as brokers to match 
suitable buyers and sellers. As more initiatives will come about, their role will increase. The role of other consultants 
who will assist parties in issues such as monitoring and quantification of C02 sequestration, and auditors is also 
likely to increase. Such consultants have already stepped into the market (an example is WSP Climate Change 
Services, part of the WSP Group, a large consultancy based in London). Landell-Mills s. Porras (2002) observed a rapid 
emergence of ancillary service providers such as advisory, exchange, brokerage, investment funding, legal advice, 
insurance, and certification. The major share is taken up by advisory service providers, which may underline the fact 
that the market is still at its early development stages. However, they also note that the market is increasingly 
dominated by the private sector in demanding and supplying carbon offsets, and as a provider of ancillary services. 
This is a sign of confidence that the carbon market will expand, which is also reflected in the shift from a series of ad 
hoc deals towards the establishment of trading systems that aim to provide a basis for numerous transactions. 
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4.6 Relation to International Trade Agreements 
Many key aspects of the CDM will entail services or service-related functions. Accordingly, one of the most important 
WTO agreements related to the CDM will be the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which has been 
adopted by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). At least three basic GATS-related components may be identified 
under the CDM: 
• Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) 
• Services employed in the development and management of CDM projects 
• Financial services related to trade in CERs 
Wiser (2002) concludes that it is unlikely that the tradable allowances issued after certification of a CDM project's 
accrued emissions reductions could reasonably be considered products or services within the range of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or GATS, but rather as a tradable license or permit. This will probably imply 
that countries will have the freedom to regulate CERs in ways they believe are appropriate, without concern that 
such treatment will be subject to WTO jurisdiction. 
Secondly, many of the individual services that collectively constitute CDM project development are likely to fall under 
one or more of the categories identified in the list of services covered by the GATS. However, two of the most 
important GATS provisions affecting the treatment of those services are 'opt-in' commitments. Very few WTO members 
have made commitments for the energy or environmental services sectors, which are among the most important 
service sectors for CDM projects. This means that countries have the opportunity to take the initiative to ensure that 
the GATS enhances rather than interferes with the CDM's sustainable development objectives. 
4.7 CDM community forestry projects 
Smith & Scherr (2002), in a study drawing on experiences with pilot carbon projects and social forestry, conclude 
that many types of CDM projects could potentially contribute to local livelihoods and ecosystem restoration, as well 
as to carbon emission offsets. However, this will only be possible if a number of criteria are met, which are discussed 
in detail in section 5.2 on institutions. 
In general, projects that sequester C02 will be profitable when returns (i.e. price per ton C received) are higher than 
the costs (i.e. cost incurred per ton C sequestered). The cost structure of a C02 sequestration project consists of 
the costs involved in the C02 sequestration itself (e.g. the establishment of a forest or plantation) but also of the 
costs involved in management of the CDM which are called transaction costs. These costs are also linked to the 
guidelines established for CDM projects (e.g. on additionality, leakage, permanence). 
Production costs are the costs per metric ton of carbon of establishing and maintaining the new carbon-augmenting 
land use. These include tree establishment, management, processing and the opportunity costs of land. To 
realistically reflect cost effectiveness of the project, production costs should be adjusted to take account of 
leakage, project duration and the risk of project failure. These aspects are usually not taken into account. 
Transaction costs are also often forgotten when calculating the costs of a project (Smith & Scherr, 2002). However, 
these costs will play a role in every carbon sequestration (CDM) programme. They usually consist of the following 
(Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002): 
• Project identification - searching and selecting projects that will meet Kyoto as well as national crediting 
requirements 
• Project design and implementation 
• Project monitoring, enforcement and risk management 
• Host countries and national project review — clarification and streamlining national and international registration 
and approval processes 
• Marketing 
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Smith & Scherr (2002) have looked into the production and transaction costs based on a number of studies on 
different forestry projects: 
Large-scale industrial plantation: Could supply carbon protection at under $ 5 per ton C, especially when carried out 
on degraded lands with low opportunity costs. However, the studies usually ignored leakage and transaction costs 
and make no adjustment for project duration. 
Agro-forestry and community forest plantations: cost of production differs per type of plantation. Costs will be higher 
than large-scale industrial plantations because of additional costs such as compensation payments to farmers, 
co-ordination and management costs of groups of farmers. Estimates in seven studies (including forest fallow) range 
from US$ 8 to 70 per ton C. However, the studies usually did not include leakage, transaction costs of project 
duration. 
Assisted natural regeneration: The production costs of these schemes tend to be lower than tree planting and are 
therefore cheaper than agro-forestry and community plantations. 
Strict forest protection: Although these projects can supply carbon at a low price (under 5 per ton C), the transaction 
costs can be substantial, as well as the cost of leakage. 
Multiple use community forestry within protected areas: The costs of such projects will be higher than under strict 
forest protection because of the costs that involvement of communities incur. However, the costs of leakage will 
probably be lower, as well as the risk of project failure because the local communities have a stake in protecting the 
forest. 
Poffenberger et al. (2001) note that within the context of carbon-credit based financing programs, transaction costs 
are likely to be higher than in conventional (community forestry) programs due to the stringent reporting requirements 
and the additional costs of dealing with international mechanisms and markets. These transaction costs will increase 
as the role of the third party 'manager' (e.g. forestry department, NGO) increases. Giving communities greater 
authority and control over funds for project management and operations would likely reduce transaction costs. 
However, involving communities also incurs transaction costs, especially when the communities are characterised 
by a high degree of conflict (De Jong eta/., 2000). 
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5. Institutional system 
All well functioning markets rely on a strong institutional foundation. This is especially true for markets for 
environmental services. Legal and financial structures need to be effective and transparent, but also the way in 
which the commodity (e.g. biodiversity, carbon) is determined needs to be transparent and verifiable. International 
rules and guidelines on how to determine and report changes in carbon are still being developed. 
The institutional setting is partly prescribed by the Kyoto Protocol. A national CDM Authority should be created to 
evaluate potential CDM projects and see whether they comply with national and international criteria (Kyoto Protocol, 
development plans, biodiversity and sustainability indicators). 
For Indonesia (which has not yet ratified the Kyoto Protocol) such an authority does not yet exist. Recommendations 
on the national institutional and legal framework are already presented by the Indonesian State Ministry for Environment 
(State Ministry for Environment, 2001). 
A successful CDM strategy will need active support by all regional stakeholders (local government, NGOs, private 
sector, etc.) and co-operation from the various sectors (agriculture, forestry, mining, etc.). The integration of these 
players is probably not the way to go; creating a body with the support from these players, however, could create a 
platform for discussion and co-operation. Linked to the National Authority, a Regional Focal Point for Environmental 
Services could co-ordinate and facilitate CDM projects. For example, such a body could protect the integrity of the 
projects and provide transparency towards the buyers (e.g. no double accounting), and it could assist in bundling 
small scale CDM projects and attract investors (this instead of having a lot of small scale initiatives that will confuse 
investors and leave small landowners outside the loop). 
Costa Rica has, for instance, invested substantially in its institutional and legislative framework and nurtured capacity 
so that public, private, and community stakeholders can benefit from forest conservation measures. This 
conservation infrastructure is crucial when capitalising on and benefiting from opportunities in environmental 
services. Targeting policies, institutional frameworks and human capacity is critical (GEF, 2002). 
CDM forestry projects that enhance livelihoods and result in sustained C02 emission reductions can only be 
successful when a number of conditions are met. Because these conditions are related with the (national) 
institutional environment of the project as well as the institutional arrangements the project needs to put in place, we 
will describe the required institutional settings at national level, with special reference to Indonesia, and local level on 
a more general note. 
5.1 Institutional setting at national level 
The national institutional settings are important for two main reasons. First, the host country must have institutions in 
place to facilitate the implementation of CDM. Secondly, the host country should create an enabling environment that 
support sustainable forestry-
The government of Indonesia is a signatory to the UNFCCC and ratified the convention on August 1, 1994. The 
government is also a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol but is has not ratified it. Due to the countryfs economic and 
socio-political crisis during 1997-1999, meaningful follow-up related to the Protocol has been delayed. This means 
that Indonesia has not yet established formal policies or national criteria, nor prioritised sectors with respect to 
CDM. 
In 2000, a national task force for 'Indonesia National Strategy Study on CDM' was established to advise the 
government on Indonesia's negotiating position on CDM, the benefits that could be gained from hosting CDM 
projects, CDM potentials and policies and institutions required to participate effectively. The government has 
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indicated that possible CDM projects would be mainly in energy sectors, followed by forestry 'sink' projects 
(Soerawidjaja eta/., 2001). 
In 2003, the Ministry of Environment, as focal point for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), has started an initiative to establish the Designated National Authority (DNA) for host country CDM 
approval projects in Indonesia. This initiative is funded by the German International Co-operation Agency (GTZ). The 
DNA is required by the Marrakech Accords for all host countries to approve CDM projects in their countries. In 
Indonesia, the DNA will be hosted by the Ministry of Environment as focal point of the UNFCCC and as Chair of the 
National Committee on Climate Change (NCCC). While the project will be carried out in 18-24 months, it is expected 
that a fully-functioning DNA will take place prior to the C0P9 in Milan, Italy (December 2003). To empower the DNA, 
Indonesia has submitted a law for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. The draft law is currently under deliberation of 
parliament. The Asian Development Bank, after its fact-finding mission in March 2003, is likely to approve a 
$ 900,000 advisory technical assistance (TA) to the Government of Indonesia on sequestration (forestry) CDM. The 
Ministry of Environment will assume the role as the executing agency (Pelangi News, March 2003). 
National governments also play a crucial role in creating the environment for (local) forestry projects. This includes 
defining land (use) rights, specifying entitlements to forests and forest products and ensuring forest protection. 
Especially where poor and vulnerable communities are involved, their interests should be well protected. Sari eta/. 
(2002) argue that the underlying causes of forest destruction and degradation in Indonesia are rooted in tenure 
problems, conflicting and ineffective regulatory measures, high demand for forest products, and bad governance 
and corruption. 
Rusmantoro (2002) highlights the problems of governance and bureaucracy in Indonesia which will have effect on 
implementation of CDM in Indonesia: 
'A crucial issue is how the international agenda and national commitment can be linked to the commitment of local 
government, and how the bureaucracy can be reformed. The failure of last year's multi-sector agenda under the 
Interdepartmental Committee on Forestry and other previous international programs were due to the absence of 
intensive communication to link those international commitments with national, as well as local, concerns. 
Governance and bureaucracy problems are the most important causes of forest degradation. International initiatives 
cannot be more than a trigger to further work in this area. Experience in the last two years has shown that the forest 
reform agendas that could be carried out were only those agreed through intensive communication among the 
central and local government as well as other stakeholders, followed by bureaucracy reform and strengthening. Any 
one agenda could be better than any other, but it would be futile without sufficient commitment and institutional 
capability.' 
Therefore, Sari eta/. (2002, p. 35) conclude that 'while the best way forestry CDM can contribute to the forestry 
sector is additional financial resources, the lack of which is by no means the only — even the most pressing — 
cause to forest destruction and degradation. Forestry CDM runs a risk of gross unfeasibility when faced by the 
complex institutional interplay in the forestry sector in Indonesia'. 
5.2 Institutional setting at project and local level 
A first step in establishing the institutional setting for a CDM forestry project is identifying the community that will be 
involved in the CDM project and clarifying what is expected of them (in terms of C02 sequestration) and what their 
compensation will be in a carbon contract. This will require well-functioning local institutions. Smith & Scherr (2002) 
have identified several elements for a CDM project design, based on lessons from past forestry experiences. 
27 
5.2.1 Maximise project success through strong local participation 
In a CDM project, the local suppliers of C02 reduction (groups of individual or community landowners) and the 
outside investors (or intermediary) negotiate an agreement on carbon emission reduction activities. Although we 
have seen that the national institutional framework is crucial, it is equally important that the local communities are 
involved in decisions on project design and that funds are used to finance activities that enable local people to 
increase their livelihoods. The definition and prioritisation of livelihood benefits from CDM projects and distribution of 
carbon revenues among project partners should be negotiated directly with the contracting local suppliers. 
Poffenberger eta/. (2001) describe a CDM community forestry project in Central India and how a number of 
institutions were involved. Some new organisations needed to be established to co-ordinate the program. Because 
the project aimed to empower local communities as forest managers, Forest Protection Committees and Village 
Forest Committees acted as primary implementers of the project. The support of the Forest Department to the local 
communities helped in establishing strong and successful committees and resolving conflicts. Research Institutions 
in conjunctions with the local FPC/VFCs prepared detailed designs of carbon monitoring, verifying and reporting 
system, training village monitors in the methodologies and data analysis procedures, and were responsible for 
verification of the findings. 
In Central Kalimantan, stakeholder involvement in carbon and other environmental services (e.g. biodiversity) is just 
starting. Central in these activities is the Bio-Rights initiative (www.bio-rights.org) which aims at poverty alleviation via 
payments for environmental services. 
5.2.2 Select the most suitable compensation mechanisms 
A central question in function endowment (in this case C02 sequestration in trees) is how much should be contributed 
to whom and by whom? And who should be compensated how much, in what way and for how long (Meijerink, 1995)? 
According to Smith & Scherr (2002) the compensation scheme must clearly increase the well-being of local people 
and should be negotiated directly with them. Four alternative compensation mechanisms for forest carbon projects 
can be identified: 
• Pay per tree: projects directly reward individual tree growers for carbon sequestration. 
• Pay for forest establishment or protection: projects compensate community organisations to protect/ 
regenerate forest areas or establish plantations. The community organisation distributes benefits to members. 
• Facilitate profitable and sustainable land management: projects invest in extension services, tree nurseries, 
marketing infrastructure, etc. Individual producers gain by participating in new land-use activities or sharing 
income from forest production. Sustainable forest management for instance, may make it eligible for forest 
certification and enabling producers to sell certified timber and NTFPs for a premium or as preferred suppliers 
(see also Jenkins & Smith, 1999). 
• Pay communities with improved services: projects reward communities by improving livelihoods through 
providing health clinics, education, micro-finance, enhanced rights to resources etc. 
Poffenberger eta/. (2001) in their description of the CDM community forestry project in Central India describe a 
system in which a forest-producer federation was established that negotiated a 50-year contract with a consortium 
of outside financing agencies at a fixed rate per ton per year. A part of the payments was put into community run 
micro-credit institutions and the rest was divided among the various support institutions (e.g. community group 
councils, joint account of the Federation, research institutions that provide support in training, monitoring, verification 
and reporting, the local Forest Divisions for operations that oversee the allocation of carbon credit resources and 
co-ordinate the overall technical assistance programme). 
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5.2.3 Enhance the profitability of new land uses 
Because the income from carbon payments to communities will be small in the short term, it is important to stimulate 
a portfolio of diverse income streams from forest resources to raise incomes and reduce fluctuations in income. 
Examples are to increase the productivity or value of land uses, facilitating sustainable forest certification, use of 
non-wood products, etc. This will also reduce the risks of leakage. 
5.2.4 Increase transparency in investor-community partnerships 
This is closely linked to the local institutional setting. Merely setting up institutions and organisations will not be 
sufficient. It is also important that there is mutual confidence and trust between communities and external private or 
governmental agencies. Smith & Scherr (2002) recommend that in negotiating and implementing CDM contracts 
agreements and processes must be understood and widely known. All stakeholders should agree on clearly drawn 
maps showing the boundaries of land-use and management regimes. Clear criteria and transparent mechanisms for 
the distribution of costs and benefits among multiple stakeholders should be put in place. Forest carbon contracts 
need to clearly specify issues such as the operational plan, ownership of land, carbon sequestration rights, project 
termination, project governance, financing, division of carbon credits, liabilities for failures to perform, and procedures 
for dispute resolution. 
Davis (2000) provides a blueprint for a comprehensive agreement with 16 articles for a CDM project which may 
readily be used. 
5.2.5 Reduce project marketing costs and investor risks 
Project marketing costs and investor risks are potentially high in forest carbon projects. Especially with respect to 
project duration, there are risks involved. A requirement mentioned in the Kyoto protocol is that C02 projects should 
result in long-term carbon storage change. What exactly is long-term is not clear, but for forestry it is clear that carbon 
is stored only as long as the forest (or its harvested products) exists. In contrast, fuel switching projects in the 
energy sector reduce C02 emissions permanently. With long-term forest projects there is always the risk that land 
use will change before the projected time, especially when there is strong population pressures or in case policies 
or market conditions change. The challenge therefore is finding a formula that values forest-based carbon offsets 
appropriately when set against more secure emission reductions. One way is to discount forest-based offsets to 
take account of their non-permanent nature. Another option is to devise mechanisms that provide reasonable 
assurance of indefinite sequestration. 
Besides project duration, leakage poses another risk. 'Leakage' occurs when project activities result in an increase 
in emissions outside the project, for instance, if the project leads to increased agricultural activities in forest areas 
that are outside the project. 
Risks associated with CDM can decreased in several ways (Smith & Scherr, 2002; Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002): 
• Bundling projects within a country to market a large supply of carbon offsets. 
• Pooled investments in 'mutual fund' type arrangements to lower transaction costs and the risk of individual 
project failure. 
• Branding of socially responsible investments by site labelling or social certification to market these to utility and 
other companies that seek to acquire credits labelled as 'earned from livelihood-enhancing projects'. This may 
also attract investors such as charities or development organisations. 
• Project insurance. Provide an insurance buffer, which has been adopted by Costa Rica for its Certified Tradable 
Offsets. Essentially this means that the host country supplies additional carbon sequestration as a buffer 
against unexpected loss. 
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5.2.6 Increase scale and reduce costs of community-based CDM projects 
The bigger the project area, the lower the overhead costs such as project design, management and certification. 
Smith & Scherr (2002) mention various institutional strategies that have been devised to reduce transaction costs 
and increase the scale of potential projects to keep costs of carbon offset competitive: 
• Specialised service contracts 
• Intermediary management organisations 
• Sites with established community organisations 
• Bundling environmental service payments 
• Bubble projects 
These strategies will also reduce the risks as described earlier. 
5.3 Financial institutions 
The role of financial institutions in C02 reduction trade is an important one, and it is likely that this role will increase 
in the future. However, UNEP-FI (2002) has found that most mainstream financial institutions can be categorised as 
being unaware of the business relevance of climate change issues, or have adopted a wait and see attitude. Only a 
small handful of companies are proactive and have begun to develop new products, lines of business, or new 
strategies and some have become sector leader in terms of product development and thinking on the GHG markets. 
There are several products financial institutions (banks and insurance companies) can take on: financing, insurance, 
risk transfer, financial dérivâtes, carbon investment funds, corporate equity analysis, and financial advisory services 
(e.g. trading emission reductions, portfolio advice, capital structuring advice) (see also Janssen, 2000). Risk transfer 
is especially important for projects in developing countries due to perceived high political risk. 
A financial institution can assist in prioritising the risks to be transferred, and by defining the potential third parties 
best placed to absorb the risk at the lowest cost to the project. Several risks can be envisaged in CDM projects 
such as economic risk (revenues and costs), political risk (war, political violence, expropriation), regulatory risk, 
currency volatility risk, construction risk, operating and technology risk. 
Political risk may be absorbed by lenders as part of their funding structures in some countries. However, a combination 
of political risk insurance and an existing group of lenders may provide a more attractive solution. Examples of other 
sources of political risk insurance include export credit agencies (e.g. the Export-Import Bank of the United States 
(US Exim) or Japan Exim.) or multilateral agencies (such as Japan Export and Investment Insurance (EID/MITI), or 
United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation (0PIQ). Traditional insurers are also now providing such 
insurance (C02e, 2003). 
With respect to trading, producers of emission reductions may seek to obtain performance guarantees, and insurance 
against political risks associated with the location of the project or the regulatory implications of the Kyoto Protocol 
itself. For example, one issue of concern for buyers of CDM emission credits is the political risk of the host 
government withdrawing approval of the credits at a later date. These types of cover are not yet available but they 
are expected to be obtainable in the future. Optimising the risk profile will enhance the value and attractiveness of 
emission reduction projects. 
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6. Discussion 
1. A large carbon offset potential exists in the peatlands of Central Kalimantan 
The peatlands in central Kalimantan are a large carbon reservoir; conserving this reservoir is in fact a very cost-
effective way to preserve carbon. Reducing emissions and sequestration of carbon is clearly an option in the 
deforested and degrading areas. 
CDM opportunities for reforestation exist on areas near nature reserves and on abandoned agricultural land. Large 
parts of the claimed land are unsuitable for agriculture (low soil fertility, regular flooding ...); these areas could be 
rehabilitated using local tree species. Agricultural activities in the peatland area inevitably lead to loss of organic 
matter, depleting nutrients and in the long run creating an unsuitable environment for crop production. Alternative 
systems need to be developed, e.g. livestock husbandry, agro-forestry based production systems. So far n j clear 
picture is available on the expansion of the abandoned agricultural land and the various strategies or alternative 
systems that are currently being explored. 
2. The CDM rules, when applied strictly, exclude large parts of Central Kalimantan for carbon offset projects 
Given the rules of the CDM only areas that were deforested before 1990 are eligible for reforestation and 
afforestation. Most of the forest cover in Central Kalimantan was removed after this date. Conservation of the 
existing carbon stocks is a cost-effective contribution to the greenhouse problem. However, activities aiming at the 
prevention of deforestation and conservation of the peat are not eligible for crediting under the CDM. 
3. Various (mostly uncoordinated) international initiatives (both public and private) to facilitate carbon offset 
projects exist 
Although the market for carbon emission trading is still in its infancy, a large number of international initiatives (both 
public and private) to facilitate carbon offset projects have been initiated in the past decade. Although several key 
players, amongst which notably the US, have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol; this has not prevented development of 
the market. In general, expectations are that the pressure for C02 reductions will increase in the future. This has 
induced the private sector to already invest in C02 reduction programmes or projects, and national governments to 
establish programmes for C02 reduction projects. 
4. Financial Institutions are moving in on the carbon market; the land use sector has only recently emerged in this 
market 
The expectation that C02 reduction initiatives will increase and that the market for C02 emission trading will develop 
has induced financial institutions to become more active in this area. They are slowly moving in on the carbon 
market. 
Within these developments, the land use sector has only recently emerged in the carbon market and there are still 
many uncertainties concerning the possibilities to invest in C02 emission reduction by changes in land use. 
5. The Institutional setting at a national and regional level is not clearly defined yet 
Many potential suppliers of C02 reduction are not prepared to enter the C02 market, with a notable exception of 
Costa Rica. The institutional arrangements that need to be in place (at a national and regional level) to effectively 
handle C02 reduction projects have not been clearly defined or put in place in Indonesia. This will hamper the 
establishment of CDM projects in Central Kalimantan. 
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6. A major risk for CDM in peatlands is uncontrolled fire: other risks may be rooted in the institutional setting and 
local stakeholder involvement 
Several factors can be identified that constitute a risk to possible CDM projects in Central Kalimantan. A major 
abiotic risk for CDM projects is the possibility of large-scale uncontrollable fires. Good provisions need to be made 
to prevent fires, and to cover this risk in the financial and crediting mechanisms. Other risks may be rooted in the 
institutional setting and local stakeholder involvement. Several criteria have been identified that should be in place 
when a local forestry CDM project is to be successfully implemented. Several of these criteria cannot be fulfilled 
(yet) in Kalimantan. 
7. The role of the voluntary market 
There may be opportunities to interest the voluntary market to invest in a CDM-like C02 reduction project in Central 
Kalimantan. Especially when such a project combines other objectives such as conservation of biodiversity and 
improving livelihoods of local communities with carbon sequestration. 
33 
7. References 
Anderson, J.A.R., 1983. 
'Chapter 6: The tropical peat swamps of western Malesia'. Pages 181-199 in A.J.P. Gore (editor), 
Ecosystems of the World: Mires: Swamp, Bog, Fen and Moor. New York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co. 
Aukland, L, P. Moura Costa, S. Bass, S. Huq, N. Landell-Mills, R. Tipper & R. Carr, 2002. 
Laying the Foundations for Clean Development: Preparing the Land Use Sector. A quick guide to the Clean 
Development Mechanism. IIED, London. 
Boehm, H.-D.V. & F. Siegelt, 2000. 
Application of Remote Sensing and GIS to Monitor Peatland Multi-Temporal in Central Kalimantan. 
In: Proceedings of the International Symposium on TROPICAL PEATLANDS Bogor, Indonesia, 
22-23 November 1999. Hokkaido University & Indonesian Institute of Sciences, pp. 329-347 (2000) 329. 
Brown, S., 1997. 
Forests and Climate Change and the Role of Forests as Carbon Sinks. World Forestry Congress, 
October 1999. 
Cannell, M.G.R., 1982. 
World Forest Biomass and Primary Production Data. Academic Press. London, 391 pp. 
C02e, 2003. 
Available at www.C02e.com 
Davis, P., 2000. 
Carbon Forestry Projection Developing Countries: legal issues and tools. Forest Trends Report. 
Washington, USA. 
De Conink, H.C. & N.H. van der Linden, 2003. 
An overview of Carbon Transactions - general characteristics and specific peculiarities. ECN Beleidsstudies 
ECN-C-03-022. Energieonderzoek Centrum Nederland. 
De Jong, B., R. Tipper & G. Montoya-Gomez, 2000. 
An economic analysis of the potential for carbon sequestration by forests: evidence from southern Mexico. 
Ecological Economics 33: 313-327. 
E5 News & Press, January 2003. 
http://www.e5.orgAiome.php 
EU, 2002. 
Summaries of the Union's legislation - Air Pollution. Available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/128060.htm 
Face, 2003. 
http://www.stichtingface.nl/ 
GBN,2003. 
Newsletter on Environmental Fiscal Reform: GreenBudgetNews No. 1. Available at: 
http://www.eco-tax.info/2newsmit/newseng/GBNl.html 
GEF, 2002. 
The challenge of sustainability, an action agenda for the global environment. Global Environment Facility, 
1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA. 
IPCCWGII, 2001. 
Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation & Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the 
Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). James J. McCarthy, 
Osvaldo F. Canziani, Neil A. Leary, David J. Dokken and Kasey S. White (Eds.). Cambridge University Press, UK. 
Janssen, J., 2000. 
Implementing the Kyoto Mechanism: Potential contributions by banks and insurance companies. Geneva 
Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice 25(4): 602-628 
Jenkins, M.B. & E.T. Smith, 1999. 
The business of sustainable forestry: Strategies for an industry in transition. Covelo, CA: Island Press. 
34 
Kalimantan Tengah dalam angka (kalimantan tengah in Figures), 2000. 
Badan pusat Statistik propinsi kalimantan tengah. 
Landell-Mills, N. & I.T. Porras, 2003. 
Silver bullet or fool's gold? A global review of markets for forest environmental services and their impact on 
the poor. IIED Research Report. London. 
Kuusipalo, J., T.S. Hadi, P.Lattunen, A. Otsamo, & J.A. Griffith, 1996. 
'Restoration of land productivity and environment through reforestation of Imperata cylindrica grasslands.' 
New Zealand Journal of Forestry Science 26(1-2): 307-319. 
Meijerink, G., 1995. 
Function endowment of tropical forests - safeguarding the goose with the golden eggs. Working Document 
IKC natuurbeheer 71. 
Murdiyarso, Daniel, 2003. 
CDM: Mekanisme Pembangunan Bersih. Kompas, Jakarta. 
Moura-Costa, P., no date. 
Carbon trading and investment in clean energy projects. UNCCD Field document. Ecosecurities Ltd. 
Page, S.E., F. Siegert, J.0. Rieley, H.-D.V. Boehm. & A. Jaya, 2002. 
The amount of carbon released from peat and forest fires in Indonesia during 1997. Nature 420: 61-65. 
Pelangi News, March 2003. 
http://www.pelangi.or.id/news.php 
Poffenberger, M. (ed.), N.H. Ravindranath, D.N. Pandey, I.K. Murthy, R. Bist & D. Jain, 2001. 
Communities and climate change: The Clean Development Mechanism and village-based forest restoration in 
Central India. A Case Study from Harda Forest Division, Madhya Pradesh, India. Community Forestry 
international Inc & Indian Institute of Forest Management. Santa Barbara, California. 
Rosenzweig, R., M. Varilek & J. Janssen, 2002. 
The Emerging International Greenhouse Gas market. Pew Center on Global Climate Change. Arlington USA. 
Rusmantoro, W., 2002. 
CDM Forestry in Indonesia. Spektrum Volume 2, October 2002. 
Sari, A.P., W. Rusmantoro, E. Asidin, I. Rachnan & C. Pannwibono, 2002. 
Does money grow on trees? Opportunities and challenges of forestry CDM in Indonesia. Pelangi Report. 
Pelangi, Jakarta. 
Siegert, F., G. Ruecker, A. Hinrichs & A.A. Hoffmann, 2001. 
Increased damage from fires in logged forests during droughts caused by El Nino. Nature Vol 414. 437-440. 
Smith, J. & S. Scherr, 2002. 
Forest carbon and local livelihoods: Assessment of opportunities and policy recommendations. CIFOR 
Occasional Paper No 37. CIFOR, Indonesia. 
Soerawidjaja, T.H., S. Sasmojo, N. Salim, A. Nugraha, M. Eng & E. Hendrawan, 2001. 
Clean Development Mechanism Opportunities in Indonesia. Centre for Research on Material and Energy. 
Institut Teknologi Bandung. Bandung, Indonesia. 
State Ministry for Environment, 2001. 
National Strategy Study on the Clean Development Mechanism in Indonesia. 
Subak, S., 2000. 
Forest Protection and reforestation in Costa Rica: evaluation of a clean development Mechanism Prototype. 
Environmental management Vol. 26 no 3, pp. 283-297. 
Toman, M. & M. Cazorla, 1998. 
The Clean Development Mechanism: A Primer. Weathervane Feature September 1998. 
Totten, M., 1999. 
Getting it right: emerging markets for storing carbon in forests. World Resources Institute and Forest Trends, 
Washington, USA. 
UNEP-FI, 2002. 
Climate Change and the Financial Services Industry. Module 2: Blueprint for Action. UNEP Finance initiative 
Climate Change Working Group. UNEP-FI. Available at: www.unepfi.net 
35 
Watson, R., I. Noble, B. Bolin. D. Verardo & D. Dokken (eds), 1998. 
Land Use, Land-Use Change And Forestry. IPCC Special Report. Available at: 
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/land_use/index.htm 
WCFSD, 1999. 
Our Forests, Our Future. Cambridge University Press. 
Whitmore, T.C. (editor), 1984. 
Tropical Rain Forests of the Far East. Second Edition. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Wiser, G.M., 2002. 
Frontiers in trade: the clean development mechanism and the general agreement on trade in services. 
International Journal Of Global Environmental Issues 2 (3/4): 288-309. 
Yamakura, T., A. Hagihara, S. Sukardjo, & H. Ogawa, 1986. 
'Aboveground biomass of tropical rain forest stands in Indonesian Borneo.' Vegetatio 68(2): 71-82. 
